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of Mahan's pre-I898 writings, although how many will wish to work at length through what Admiral Castex described as a style "particulierement abstraite et soporifique" is open to question. But such an exercise would find little "imperialism." The feeling that the United States should begin to look outward, "righteously but not with feeble scrupulosity," is matched by the finding that it was disinclined to do so: if, in fact, imperialism was spreading "like wildfire," Mahan did not know it. There is little stress on the expansion of the merchant marine and no concern for projection of power outside the hemisphere. Sea control, it is clearly stated, will never again be as important as during the eighteenth-century wars for empire. Emphasis is given the "aggressive restlessness" of the Europeans, as evidenced in overseas competition, and its implications for the Monroe Doctrine; the danger of possible collision with Britain, Spain, or Germany is raised; some concern is evinced about the awakening Orient. If there is a focus, it is on the strategic importance of the isthmus, and on the consequent need for protective offshore bases and a smallish but efficient navy, competent to defend against the detachments a European power might send against the United States. But the general effect is cloudy, and certainly no clear "imperialistic" plan emerges: reviewing The Interest of America in Sea Power, the British army officer George Sydenham Clarke, a great admirer of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, found it "extremely difficult to extract a definite meaning from his pages."8 It seems possible that one reason for the perdurability of these authors in treatments of this period is their use of the terms "Anglo-Saxon" and "race," in the context of what the twentieth century has done to words like these. But in I885 there was nothing either very novel or very naughty in this usage. The term "Anglo-Saxon" as an umbrella word for British and Americans was some forty years old. The word "race," as any dictionary will show, can be used in either a biological or a cultural sense, and few contemporaries would have thought that references to the "French race," the "Spanish race," or the "Anglo-Saxon" or "English-speaking" race had anything to do with the vexed question of whether the biological races of mankind numbered five as suggested by Johann Blumenbach, eleven as argued by Charles Pickering, or four as proposed by Thomas Huxley.9 If talk of the achievements of the "Anglo-Saxon race" seems nowadays a little out of style, they could hardly have been overlooked in the i88os. In extent of imperial sway no country equalled Great Britain, and in territorial growth none the United States. The Industrial Revolution, commenced in England, had leapt the Atlantic to produce a still greater economic expansion. On the scales of civil liberty and representative democracy none could match the British and Americans. Nor had any other societies deployed so many missionaries and mechanics to carry the gift of salvation, whether by conversion or modernization, to those who dwelt in darkness.
On the question of the "Anglo-Saxon race," these authors-though often confusing in their usage-were anything but racist in the anthropological sense. "I use the term," Strong wrote, "somewhat broadly to include all English-speaking peoples." In his approval of the "commingling of races" that was taking place in America, he was at one with the American editor of the Riverside Natural History who, in this same annus mirabilis of I885, argued the superiority of mixed stocks, with Darwin and with Mahan (who was very clear on the mixed origins of both British and Americans and who came to include the Japanese within the "European family"). Even Brooks Adams, who fussed a good deal about the international Jewish banking community, thought the survival of civilizations dependent upon the infusion of "barbarian blood."'0'
Since contemporaries, like later historians, may well have read selectively, one should perhaps test the assertions that these authors were influential. Josiah Strong's Our Country sold a good many copies over the years, but the book got short shrift from the establishment press and no one has yet named a policy maker influenced by Strong's ideas." John Fiske's histories decorated everyone's library shelves, but American Political Ideas, which contained his piece on " 'Manifest Destiny,' " was not one of his fastest sellers, and the allegation that he delivered this chapter as a speech to a receptive president and cabinet rests on a misreading of the evidence.'2 Brooks Adams published nothing on American foreign policy until the summer of i898." Captain Mahan no doubt deserves some credit for the increased popularity of navies and the arguments for battleships, but his principal effort to influence policy misfired badly: throughout his life he remained convinced that his annexationist article on Hawaii had brought about his transfer by the Cleveland administration from writing and lecturing at the Naval War College to a greatly undesired tour of sea duty. Yet, whatever the facts about these much-quoted intellectuals, it might still be possible that the I89os were years of burgeoning sentiment for imperialism 15 Clarke, J3ohn Fiske, 2: 472-73; and Berman, Fiske, 251-52. In December 1897 Fiske wrote an historical introduction for a book by his son-in-law on the Cuban insurrection. Although Anglo-Saxon attitudes pervaded the discussion of the "absolute despotism" of the Spanish Empire and the "Satanic" Inquisition, a strong sympathy for the Cuban cause led to the argument that "for the sake of Cuba's best interests, it is to be hoped that she will win her independence without receiving from any quarter, and especially from the United States, any such favors as might hereafter put her in a position of tutelage.
Grover Another context in which it is useful to remember that words are not things, and to look through the word to the phenomenon for which it stands, is in discussion of navies and naval bases. The creation of the new American navy in the last two decades of the century was an event of undoubted importance, which might, at first glance, seem to provide bureaucratic evidence for an expansionist policy. But navies can be designed for various purposes: there is no necessary connection between naval building and commercial expansion or colonization, and battleships do not equate with empire.23 The military characteristics of a nayal force-the capabilities designed into it-should give some indication of its intended missions; and the reiterated statements of the secretaries to the effect that the New Navy was purely defensive, intended only "as a police force for the preservation of order and never for aggression," are substantiated by the instrument that they created.24
Given the limitations of American industry, reinforced as they were by American naval tradition, the first phase of naval revival perforce involved the construction of that "fleet of swift cruisers to prey on the enemy's commerce" desired by Mahan. Here the remoteness of the United States from important European trade routes and from such centers of interest as the River Plate, Valparaiso, and Honolulu strongly affected ship characteristics and by 1890 had brought about the design of cruisers of remarkable coal capacity and endurance. Such ships would seem to have been ideally suited for distant ventures; but, once domestic sources of armor and of castings for gun barrels became available, the emphasis switched to the completion of heavily armed monitors for harbor defense and to construction of "sea-going coastline battleships," restricted in range by congressional enactment and in draft by the hydrography of gulf ports, to contest the control of North American waters. Still further expression of these defensive concerns developed during the 189os in the authorization of a score of short-range torpedo boats and in the recommendation of 1897-based on the argument that "the traditional policy of our Navy has been a defensive one"-that future units of this type be designed to use the new oil fuel available only at home.25
In the early years of the building program the emphasis on commerce raiding and defense of home waters had left the ancient mission of maintaining a presence on such distant stations as the China coast and the River Plate to the wooden ships of the Old Navy. But, as these decayed beyond repair or were washed or blown ashore, replacements became necessary. Over a period of ten years, beginning in 1885, authorization was secured for a number of new gunboats for this service; and, since coaling stations in these far-off regions existed neither in fact nor in contemplation, the specifications for four of the class of I895 called for "full sail power." Finally, it may be noted, the New Navy was not, as seems sometimes assumed, the product of a presumably expansionist Republican Party: by I896 the two Cleveland administrations had gained authorization for half again as much tonnage as had those of Arthur and Harrison.26
Related to the naval building question is "the search for bases." Unquestionably, the coming of steam raised serious problems of range and endurance for the world's navies, but solutions to the coal problem varied as widely as the intended employment of the forces to be coaled. A rented site for a coal pile at Yokohama, Honolulu, or Pago Pago was one thing; a defended position like Gibraltar, Aden, or Hong Kong was quite another. When considering the meaning of such terms as "base" and "coaling station," it is well to be as precise as possible, and precision in chronology is also desirable. Generally, it may be said, these relations were far more individual than governmental. As the wounds of war healed, an extraordinarily energetic society deployed its representatives abroad in a wide variety of roles: explorers, tourists, art collectors, philanthropists, missionaries, synarchists, railroad promoters, and mining engineers. Although much of this activity was sufficiently traditional, its scale and impact were increasing as a result of the remarkable economic development of these years, itself evidenced externally in three important and interconnected ways: the growth of North Atlantic objective, the aim was merely to gain leverage to pry Spain out of Cuba and to acquire security for the payment of an indemnity. The role reversal that found the Spanish giving up the islands and the United States doing the paying had occurred to none: in the words of the distinguished naval officer who wrote the history of the war, "Perhaps none were more surprised to find a great archipelago at their command than were the gentlemen composing the administration in Washington."52
Lamenting the "Great Aberration," Samuel Flagg Bemis once echoed McKinley's observation that, if only "old Dewey" had sailed along home after the battle, it would have saved much subsequent complication. It is in many ways an appealing thought, but to have done so would have been to abandon a war that had barely begun and to forego that "inducement" to Spain -to leave Cuba that had been the object of the move against the Philippines. Yet, while departure was unthinkable, to remain was impossible without support from home. If there had been no war, the process of the "Americanization of the world," which so commended itself to the British reformer and journalist W. T. Stead (and which so exasperated other Englishmen), would no doubt have continued.58 American heiresses would have continued to marry British milords; missionaries and student volunteers would have persisted in their work for China; engineers, promoters, and salesmen would have pressed on with their activities; multinational corporations would have continued to expand; Carnegie libraries would have gone on proliferating throughout the Englishspeaking world. But in political terms the outward thrust would, in all probability, have conformed to the relaxed anticipations of "Jingo Jim" Blaine, the strategic parameters of the "imperialistic" Mahan, and the proposals of the Republican platform of I896: a suitable measure of control over the impending isthmian canal, over protective Caribbean naval bases, and over the Hawaiian islands. In the circumstances of the time, such a defensive policy seems quite reasonable.
